The Secure Shell (SSH) protocol requires all implementations to support public key authentication method ("publickey") for authentication purposes [2] . Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) applications which provide a SSH client over the web browser need to support "publickey". However, restrictions in HTTP, such as Same Origin Policy, make it difficult to perform such authentications. In this document, a system to perform "publickey" authentication over HTTP is provided. It is ensured that no compromise is made that would pose a security risk to SSH protocol.
Introduction
The Secure Shell (SSH) protocol is a protocol for secure remote login to servers. It computes a shared key through key exchange mechanisms, such as Diffie-Hellman key exchange [3] , and establishes a secure channel for communication to servers. Users are authenticated through the secure channel using one of the accepted authentication methods. Commonly used authentication methods include "password" and "publickey". As the name suggests, in case of "password" method, the user is simply required to provide his/her password for authentication. However, "publickey" method uses public/private key pairs for authentication.
The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is an application-level protocol for data transfer across the internet. It is generic, stateless and can be used for purposes beyond hypertext.
2 Authentication "publickey"
In "publickey" authentication method, User creates a public/private key pair and adds the public key on the server. For successful authentication, the SSH protocol requires the message [2] , shown below, to be signed by the private key of the user. And, the signed message should be verified by the server using the public key added by the user. On successful verification, authentication is successful and the user is permitted to login. string session identifier byte SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST string user name string service name string "publickey" boolean TRUE string public key algorithm name string public key blob
The session identifier, shown above, is a secret and is specific to that SSH session. It is common for private keys to be kept in an encrypted format for security reasons. However, this creates the hassle of decrypting the private key for authentication every single time. Authentication agents, such as ssh-agent [4] , handle this by managing the decrypted private keys and signing messages for SSH clients on demand.
Authentication agents
ssh-agent implements OpenSSH agent protocol [4] to manage private keys and to sign messages. Clients connect to the agent, typically, over an UNIX domain socket to send requests and receive responses. UNIX domain socket is a special file in the file system. To restrict access, the special file has read/write permissions only for the user.
If we could implement an authentication agent, similar to ssh-agent, that would manage private keys but accept signing requests over HTTP. That would be an agent which can enable SSH "publickey" authentications through HTTP clients.
SSH Web Agent
Here, we are defining a new authentication agent, ssh-webagent, which responds to authentication requests over HTTP. It accepts requests only from user and only on localhost. And, due to same origin policy, HTTP clients will not accept content from localhost unless Cross Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) [5] is enabled. It is also recommended that ssh-webagent accept HTTP requests over TLS [7] to avoid Mixed Content [6] .
Trusted Servers
On receiving an authentication request, it is important to identify the source of the request. A HTTP client could connect to ssh-webagent out of any web page, and without verification, a serious security risk exists. To verify the source, a combination of HTTP Referer header and public key of the server should be used. While the Referer header can be used to identify the public key of the server, the actual verification is successful only if the signature provided by the server is valid.
Server's public key and HTTP Referer changes for each web application. It is therefore recommended that a trusted servers file is used to hold the public key of trusted servers along with the expected values of HTTP Referer header. The trusted servers file should be kept safe to avoid unauthorized modifications. A sample format for trusted servers file has been provided in Appendix A.
Identifiers
HTTP is stateless and each request is independent of the other. Each HTTP request has a corresponding response but the order of HTTP requests and state, if any, shall be managed by the application.
In case of authentication over a TCP connection, a session is established and can be uniquely identified by 5-tuple 1 . However, HTTP provides no session and hence ssh-webagent has to establish a logical session to the trusted server and assign a unique identifier. ssh-webagent can interact with multiple trusted servers at the same time. And, ssh-webagent shall choose the unique identifier.
The state of the authentication process shall be maintained in association with the identifier. However, it should be noted that, a failure in the authentication process may not always be known to ssh-webagent. So, it is essential to maintain a reasonably short timeout for the authentication process, beyond which the identifier and its associated state is destroyed.
Local User and Local Host
Since ssh-webagent accepts authentication request on localhost, it shall be ensured that the request is from the same user who runs ssh-webagent. Support for this feature varies across operating systems and Appendix C shows how the owner of a TCP connection can be identified on systems running Linux kernel.
When ssh-webagent binds to a specific port on localhost, no other user will be able to use the same port. So, applications which intend to support multiple local users, can choose multiple ports and send authentication request to all of them. A standard has been proposed to use a specific local IP address and port for ssh-webagent in Appendix B.
Session
ssh-webagent shall establish a secure session with the trusted server before processing authentication requests. The session is initiated by a signed request from the trusted server with Diffie-Hellman (DH) 2 parameters. On successful verification, sshwebagent shall send a Diffie-Hellman response with an encrypted identifier. The secret established through Diffie-Hellman key exchange shall be used in the encryption of the identifier. And, once the trusted server successfully decrypts this identifier, the session is established.
The authentication process following session creation, will use the identifier in both clear and encrypted data. ssh-webagent shall identify the session using the clear text identifier. However, it shall verify that the identifier in encrypted data matches the one in clear text.
Proposed Protocol
In this section, we define a protocol over HTTP that can be used for "publickey" authentication. It involves both session creation and authentication process. We start with the format of HTTP requests and responses before discussing each of them in detail.
HTTP Request/Response
The protocol uses base64 encoded messages in both HTTP request and response. HTTP request shall use method POST and content type application/x-www-form-urlencoded, while HTTP response shall use content type text/plain. HTTP request in this format will classify as simple cross-site request under CORS specification [5] .
P=[Message]&U=[User]&S=[Service]
As a POST request, the key P shall be used to pass messages and, optionally, the keys U and S shall be used to pass user and service names 3 respectively.
[Message]
The response body simply contains the message in response to the request and nothing more.
Message
Message is the basic unit of the protocol. A single message is received in the HTTP request and a single message is sent in the HTTP response. Message uses a binary format and data types used, in representation of the format, are as defined in RFC 4251 [1] , Section 5 "Data Type Representations Used in the SSH Protocols". string "SSHWebAgent" byte version byte type string data version shall indicate the version of the protocol and shall be used to check compatability of sshwebagent and trusted server.
VERSION_1_1 0x11
type shall indicate the type of data the message holds. KEX_DH_REQUEST 0x02 KEX_DH_RESPONSE 0x03 PRIVATE 0x04 data holds request parameters and response values in binary format. The format varies based on type and, hence, are described in their respective sections.
Session
Session is initiated by a message from trusted server containing key exchange parameters and its signature. The message will contain data of type KEX_DH_REQUEST in the format described below, k, sign are the public key and signature, of the trusted server, represented in their respective formats as defined in RFC 4253 [3] , Section 6.6 "Public Key Algorithms".
Verification
On receiving the message, ssh-webagent uses the trusted servers file and checks if the public key and the HTTP Referer are trusted. On a successful match, the message shall be checked for authenticity through signature verification. The following values are used in the specified order for signing and verification, mpint p mpint g mpint e string method string referer string k string d method shall be the method used in HTTP request. As mentioned in Section 5.1, this shall be POST.
referer shall be the value of Referer field in HTTP request header.
Response
On successful verification of signature, ssh-webagent shall send a message containing data of type KEX_DH_RESPONSE in the format described below, mpint f string E f is the computed value of ssh-webagent in key exchange.
E is the encrypted message body of type NEW viewable only by trusted server. message body is described, in detail, in Section 5.4.
Secret
The secret S is computed by ssh-webagent through Diffie-Hellman key exchange and it is used to compute a shared secret, a secret key and an initialization vector. Once the trusted server receives the response message. It computes its own values for the above and decrypts the message body.
Message Body
The message body holds the cipher text for communication between ssh-webagent and trusted server. It also includes the session identifier and the encryption algorithm for decryption purposes. The type of message body and its related contents are encrypted and stored in cipher text.
format
The binary format of message body is shown below, byte algorithm string identifier string ciphertext algorithm used for encryption can be identified using this field. Currently supported encryption algorithms and their respective values are listed below,
AES_256_CBC 0x02
identifier is the session identifier.
ciphertext is the encrypted part of message body.
ciphertext and plaintext
The encrypted contents of ciphertext, namely the plaintext, shall be in the format specified below, identifier is the session identifier and it shall be the same as identifier defined in Section 5.4.1.
payload shall be zero or more bytes of message content. The format of payload depends on message body type and they are described in detail in their respective sections.
padding shall be zero or more bytes of random padding to meet the block size requirements of encryption algorithms.
NEW
First message with a message body, in a session, is always of type NEW. This message is sent by sshwebagent to trusted server. It should be noted that payload is empty and, hence, is not shown in plaintext.
Authentication
The authentication process shall be initiated by trusted server after establishing a session. The messages used in the process are as defined in Section 5.2 and shall contain message body as data and shall use type PRIVATE.
Request
A request for "publickey" authentication is sent by the trusted server in the form of a message containing data of type PRIVATE and message body of type AUTH_REQUEST. 
Response
In response to the request, ssh-webagent shall use SSH session identifier, construct the SSH message and sign it with one or more private keys of the user. The resulting signatures are sent securely in a response message to the trusted server for successful authentication. options shall be used to pass information to the trusted server in the form of key-value pairs.
It shall use the format as specified below, uint32 n byte es string [n] option And, each option shall hold a key and a value as shown below, string key string value
The value shall be encrypted using an encryption scheme es. The following encryption schemes shall be supported,
PKCS1_RSAES_OAEP 0x02
PKCS1_RSAES_OAEP encryption scheme shall use the public key of trusted server to encrypt the value.
On receiving the response message, the trusted server shall have all that it needs to perform "publickey" authentication in Secure Shell (SSH) protocol.
Performance
The authentication method ensures that the remote login to server is secure. But, for the task at hand, it is most likely a hindrence and sooner it is done, the better. The primary contributing factors to longer authentication time would be network latency to trusted server. Data encryption, signing and verification are reasonably quick on modern processors and are negligible in comparison. The latency to web agent will also be negligible since it resides on localhost.
The protocol uses HTTP requests to receive and send messages. Hence, session establishment and authentication process will each require three HTTP requests, when done synchronously. First request shall be used to get the message (request) from trusted server, second request shall be used to pass the message (request) to web agent and receive a message (response) and the final request shall be used to pass the message (response) to trusted server. With two requests to trusted server per session establishment and authentication process. A total of four requests to trusted server remain the primary contributing factors to performance.
HTTP request to trusted server will be over TLS. Hence, apart from the usual TCP connection negotiation, a TLS session negotiation will also happen when a new connection is established. So, the first request will take a significantly longer time, in comparison to subsequent requests to trusted server. The total time taken to complete four requests can be significant and can be a hinderance. To achieve better performance, it is recommended that the network latency to trusted server remains below 80ms.
Conclusion
Secure Shell protocol has been commonly used for remote login to servers. It is the first step to managing servers remotely. As the number of servers increase, the problem of logging to multiple servers, a time consuming task, become apparent. These problems can be solved to an extent through applications which abstract out and automatically login to servers. However, these applications may require the private key of user for automatic login.
In a world with increasing use of virtualization, more and more servers (or virtual servers) are purchased from providers and managed remotely over public internet using a web browser. In the absense of a method for secure remote login to these servers, users are left to use traditional tools for login or at worst, take a security risk and, give away the private key to third-party applications.
Hence, solving the problem of secure remote login ("publickey") over the web, ie., HTTP, will open doors for easier access to servers. And, bring back private keys to the hands of the user. When combined with a powerful server management application, this can bring servers to general public, who, without any technical knowledge, can avail internet services through their servers in a decentralized manner.
HTTP/TLS protocol requires web agent to use a TLS certificate signed by a trusted certificate authority. TLS certificates are, typically, issued for a domain instead of an IP address.
TLS certificate and its private key will need to be distributed along with web agent. Hence, they should be considered public. And, on the same note, for security reasons, it is recommended that the entire domain is considered public and subdomains are not used for any other purpose.
The domain localhost-ssh-webagent.in has been assigned for this purpose and it resolves to the suggested IPv4 address, 127.82.11.29. The whois information for localhost-ssh-webagent.in provides the current contact to obtain TLS certificates.
C Connection Owner
A web agent listening on loopback interface can be connected to by any user. This results in a privilege escalation and unauthorized access to private key. This security issue can be mitigated by ensuring that the remote end of the local connection belongs to the owner of the web agent process itself. The premise here is that the owner of the web agent process is given access to the private key and hence can allow access to the same user.
On linux kernels, /proc/net/tcp provides a formatted output of active connections. In this output, the columns local_address, rem_address and uid are of relevance to us. The IPv4 address and port in the output are shown in hexadecimal.
The sample output below shows the web agent listening on 127.82.11.29:8211 (1), a SSH server listening on 0.0.0.0:22 (2) and a SMTP server listening on 127.0.0.1:25 (3). It should be noted that the uid for web agent is 1000, indicating a user, while the uid for others is, 0 indicating the superuser. In case of a mismatch, the connection has originated from a different user and should be rejected.
